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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LIEN LAW
tained would mitigate in favor of the police considering virtually all
arrest records essential. An opportunity for a collateral attack upon the
police discretion would be beyond the means of most individuals and,
consequently, would not constitute a viable remedy. A procedure similar
to that used in issuing search warrants would serve the dual purpose of
providing objectivity and alleviating the necessity of the individual taking
the initiative in protecting fundamental rights. In addition, a high vis-
ibility decision-making process would facilitate judicial establishment of
standardized guidelines by which the close cases could be resolved. Ad-
mittedly, this procedure is not demanded by the language of the constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the courts have traditionally been willing to require
particular procedures when it is apparent they are essential to insure
constitutionally protected rights. 2
Constantly expanding capacity to secure and maintain massive quan-
tities of data on individuals has placed the right to privacy on the cutting
edge of the law. Menard represents the beginning of more intense judicial
involvement in this area. However, a definitive demarcation by appellate
courts of the boundaries of police rights in the record retention context
is critical.
Coy E. BREWER, JR.
Constitutional Law-The North Carolina Public Assistance Lien Law
and Current Constitutional Doctrine
"Beneficient provisions for the poor, the unfortunate and orphan [is]
one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian state. . . ."I Such was
the philosophy of "welfare" when the framers wrote the North Carolina
Constitution of 1868. By mid-twentieth century, however, the "benef-
icence" associated with public assistance in North Carolina was sharply
curtailed for some groups among the poor. The change came with the
enactment of North Carolina's first "welfare lien" laws.2 For the first time
in the state's history, public assistance was conditioned on eventual repay-
ment through statutory liens on real property.'
"'An excellent example of a procedure established by the courts to secure a con-
stitutionally based right is that outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'N.C. CONsT. art. XI, § 7 (1868).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-29 to -37.1 (Supp. 1969).
'As recently as 1969, thirty-three other states had some type of repayment pro-
visions under federal-state funded programs. While such provisions are not required
1971]
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Though there is a dearth of literature and case law on North Carolina's
lien laws,4 some of the federal constitutional doctrine that has evolved
within the last two or three decades is highly relevant to the North Caro-
lina statute and its administration. It is significant that the statute has
never been challenged on constitutional grounds and that lien laws
throughout the nation have generally escaped such a fate. The poverty
of the potential litigants and their lack of adequate representation have
made them for the present, at least, part of a silent minority. The important
issues confronting North Carolina welfare legislation, however, can be
highlighted by a brief examination of developing constitutional doctrine
as it has related to other lien laws, welfare legislation generally, and allied
fields.
In Snell v. Wyman5 the United States Supreme Court affirmed with-
out opinion a three-judge district court decision rejecting a challenge to
the New York repayment law. Under the New York law, a person other-
wise eligible for public assistance who owns real or personal property is
deemed to have an "implied contract" with the welfare department for the
full amount of assistance rendered.6 Among the four plaintiffs in Snell
was a nineteen-year-old mother with three children receiving AFDC pay-
ments. In 1967 she was involved in an auto accident, and as a condition to
her continued receipt of public assistance, she was required to execute an
"assignment of proceeds of lawsuit." This document served to assign the
proceeds of her personal injury claim to the Department of Social Services.
Another plaintiff whose income was eighty-six dollars per week, and who
was also receiving AFDC to help support his eight children, suffered per-
sonal injuries in the public housing project where he lived and was forced
to quit his job. In 1967 this plaintiff received four hundred dollars from
the New York City housing authorities as compensation for his injury,
by the states, and while the original Social Security Act was silent on state re-
imbursement, Congress has acquiesced to those states requiring repayment and now
provides that a proportionate amount of money collected shall go to the federal
government. HEW, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS UN-
DER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, PUBLIC AssISTANCE REPORT No. 50 (1964 ed.).
'See R. Ligon, North Carolina Old Age Assistance Lien Law, March, 1960
(unpublished study located at the Institute of Gov't, Chapel Hill, N.C.).
393 U.S. 323 (1969) (per curiam), aF'g, 281 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
6 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 104 (McKinney 1966).
281 F. Supp. at 857. The Attorney General of North Carolina has stated that
although proceeds from a wrongful death action are not "assets" of an estate under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173, if the judgment of the court in a criminal prosecution
for manslaughter directs that an amount of money be paid an administrator of the
deceased-recipient, those funds do become assets of the estate that can be applied
to an assistance claim. See R. Ligon, mpra note 4, at 32.
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but these funds were soon exhausted. The Department of Social Services
required endorsement over of one of three disability insurance checks and
asserted a "notice of lien" in the amount of 420 dollars for assistance
furnished after the accident.8 In addition to the liens on potential or actual
recoveries for personal injuries, liens on an interest in real property and
on an assignment of the interest of an insured recipient in life insurance
policies were also involved. 9
The plaintiffs argued that the repayment provisions were "arbitrary,
oppressive, and irrational," that the state was defeating its own announced
objective of seeking to make welfare recipients productive and self-support-
ing, and that the laws were contrary to the plaintiffs' own desires for
human dignity and independence. They also argued that the state's only
"conceivable rationale" for these laws was to save money but pointed out
that in 1966 of 1,200,000,000 dollars spent for public aid, only 5,000,000
dollars was recovered through liens.10
In rejecting the due process arguments, the three-judge court stated
that it could hold the statutes unconstitutional only if it were invested with
a power under the due process clause to invalidate state laws on the basis
that they might be "improvident" or "unwise."'" Yielding to the Supreme
Court's traditional nonintervention policy in cases in which the major
impact is "economic," the court said:
[I]t is not for federal judges to be "liberal" or "conservative" in ad-
vancing and ordering measures which undoubtedly related to basic
matters of human decency .... The constricted test in this forum is
one of minimal rationality. 12
Plaintiffs also argued that they were denied equal protection since the
state supplied many benefits for which it did not seek repayment and dis-
criminated between those who had property and those who did not. With
equal finesse the court blunted these arguments:
Like the life of the law generally, the Fourteenth Amendment was not
designed as an exercise in logic. It is ancient learning by now that a
classification meets the equal protection test "if it is practical, and is
not reviewable unless palpably arbitrary."'
3
' 281 F. Supp. at 858.
0Id. at 860.
20 Id. at 861 n.16.
" Id. at 862.
2 Id. at 863.
" Id. at 865. The California Supreme Court has held that the estate of a daugh-
ter could not be held liable for the mother's care at a state mental institution. The
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Snell is significant because it is patently inconsistent with most of the
equal protection standards established by the Supreme Court during the
past quarter century, sometimes referred to as the "new" equal protection.
14
Where the impact of legislation has fallen on fundamental social concerns."5
as opposed to purely economic relations, the Court has demanded a close
analysis of several elements, including the legitimacy of the classification
established by the law, the relationship between the classification and the
purpose that the state is trying to promote, and finally, the validity of the
state's purpose itself."6 Professor Karst has summarized the constitutional
effect of the new equal protection:
What emerges from the new equal protection cases is an extremely
flexible sliding scale for measuring the required degree of intensity
state's attempt to recover was deemed a denial of equal protection in that "the cost
of maintaining the state's institution, including the provision of adequate care for
its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in society." Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1965). For general commentary on welfare lien laws see Graham, Public
Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 451
(1968); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits With Strings At-
tached, 54 CALIF. L. Rnv. 443 (1966); Comment, Snell v. Wyman and the Col-
stitutional Issues Posed by Welfare Payments Provisions, 55 VA. L. Rnv. 177
(1969). For a biting attack on various state lien laws, in which the North Caro-
lina statute is criticized, see SOUTH: TODAY, July-August, 1970, at 4.
' See Horowitz & Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in
Public Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within A
State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 787 (1968); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 716 (1969).
"- Outside the area of free expression, the Supreme Court has labeled the follow-
ing as "fundamental" rights: voting, education, procreation, marriage, fairness in
the criminal process, and the right to travel. Karst, supra note 14.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970), the Court declared welfare
benefits a matter of "statutory entitlement" for those qualified. Justice Brennan,
writing for the court, rejected the idea that public assistance was a mere charity,
emphasizing that it was a "means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity."' Judge Frankel, writing
for the three-judge court in S*nell recognized that the "primitive needs of desperate
people" is a different matter than purely economic concerns but refused to give
such a difference constitutional distinction. The court added that its decision was
in no way to be construed that welfare was not a "right" coming within the scope
of the fourteenth amendment. 281 F. Supp. at 863 n.19.
" In cases in which classifications have been based on race, wealth or some
other nonvoluntary status, the Supreme Court has insisted on a tight connection
between the challenged legislation and the state's objective. A mere "rational"
nexus is clearly insufficient. In such cases involving "fundamental" rights, the
court will also weigh the state interests carefully, even if they concededly have
validity. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
[Vol. 49
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of judicial scrutiny of the legislative classification .... The more the
victims of legislative classification appear to be disadvantaged, the less
need there is for their interests to be basic .... The result .. .is not
that the claim of constitutional right is absolute, but that it will prevail
unless it is outweighed by a strong showing of justification by the
state.17
The court in Snell clearly chose not to conform to the new equal pro-
tection formula,' 8 though that formula has been adhered to in other cases
dealing with welfare issues.' 9 The inconsistencies that mark this area of
the law, as well as other more stable constitutional doctrines, have im-
portant ramifications for the North Carolina welfare lien law.
North Carolina's first welfare lien law was created in 1951, but it
applied only to aged persons receiving assistance.20 In 1963 the General
Assembly adopted a similar law applicable to those receiving aid under the
permanently and totally disabled category,2 ' and in 1969 the lien laws were
amended and consolidated without significant change.2" Assistance to those
aged or disabled persons who owned any real property was conditioned on
their agreeing to a lien for the amount of assistance which they might
receive, while aid under the other federally and locally funded programs
remained unconditional. 3 At the termination of the recipient's aid or at his
death, the county department of social services determines the amount of
real property owned by the recipient including that acquired subsequent
to the lien; the department also determines if the recipient owns personal
property worth over one hundred dollars. In the event the recipient or his
estate satisfies either of these requisites, the county department prepares
a report, and the county attorney then enforces the lien."' Unlike the New
" Karst, supra note 14, at 744-45.
1 In another case involving the state's discretion in allocating welfare funds,
the Court recognized that public assistance "involves the most basic economic needs
of human beings" but followed Snell in applying minimum rationality standards.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
10 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
20 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-30.1 (1966).
21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-73.12a (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-20 to -37.1 (Supp. 1969).
"Recipients of Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC), Aid to the Blind (AB),
and those receiving "general assistance" money are unaffected by the lien laws.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-36, -37 (Supp. 1969). The liens are renewable pro-
vided the recipient continues to receive public assistance and an additional state-
ment is filed and properly indexed. Once the assistance terminates the lien is not
renewable, and no action may be brought to enforce the lien more than ten years
after the last day on which assistance was paid nor more than three years after
1971]
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York lien statute, .which provides for an implied contract between the
department of social services and the recipient, the North Carolina law
places a "general claim and a lien" on the real property of the person. The
state courts have held that when the recipient dies the claim must first be
satisfied from personal property in the same manner other claims against
the estate are satisfied. When the personal property is insufficient, the real
property is sold to satisfy the obligation.25
Whether the North Carolina statute as presently administered could
withstand the Court's rigorous scrutiny under the "new" equal protection
doctrine, or even meet some of the relaxed standards as expressed in Snel
is open to debate. While the Supreme Court has said that where the state
regulates or interferes with fundamental freedoms, " '[p] recision of reg-
ulation must be the touchstone,' "26 the major infirmity of the North
Carolina law rests in its lack of precision, both in framing and admin-
istration.
It is significant that the majority in Snell recognized the need for some
precision with regard to the nature of the property that could be subject
to the liens. Acknowledging that there are administrative qualifications
upon the state's right to recover, the court pointed out that except in cases
of fraud, no reimbursement is sought from property acquired by earnings
after a recipient has gone off welfare. The fact that such earnings are
exempted, in the words of the court, "leave wholly unfettered the desire and
search for independence through gainful work."' 2T The New York statute
was designed to catch primarily "windfall" property, i.e., any property not
"gainfully earned."
the date of the recipient's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-33 (Supp. 1969). No en-
forcement is possible as long as the recipient, or after his death his surviving
spouse, dependent minor child, or dependent adult child with a mental or physical
disability (and incapable of self-support) is occupying the property as a home-
site. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-34 (Supp. 1969).
"' Brunswick County v. Vitou, 6 N.C. App. 54, 169 S.E.2d 234 (1969). The
Attorney General has given his opinion that the former old age assistance lien did
not apply to property held by the entirety, although it does apply to tenancies in
common. See Letter from Attorney General to W.E. Bateman, subject: S.M.
Woodley, 89-448-1249; Assistance Lien; Tenancy by the Entirety; Tenancy in
Common; dated 24 May 1967. (On file at the Institute of Gov't, Chapel Hill,
N.C.). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-31 (Supp. 1969), makes the filing of the lien "due
notice" to the recipient of the obligation against his real property.
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965), quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
"7281 F. Supp. at 862. Judge Kaufman, dissenting in Snell, was dissatisfied
with the majority's view that the administrative qualifications were adequate,
choosing not to discern merely between property "gainfully earned" and other
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The North Carolina statute makes no distinction between "windfall"
and earned property but subjects all property, earned or otherwise ac-
quired, to the claim or lien.2" The only "precision" required by North
Carolina is that personal property be exhausted before realty, and that
mandate is not even statutory.2 9 The rationale for North Carolina's lack
of precision in determining which property is susceptible would seem to be
that those who are aged or permanently and totally disabled no longer
enjoy an "earning capacity" at the time they receive public assistance,
and that there is only a minimal chance that such persons will gainfully
earn any property after receiving aid. This does not, however, explain
the consequences of the liens upon property gainfully earned before the
relief is sought.
The administration of the welfare lien in North Carolina is left almost
totally in the hands of the counties, and the county attorneys enforce the
law at the appropriate time. There is evidence that enforcement throughout
the state is not uniform and that in at least one county the lien laws are
not enforced at all.30 An amendment to the law in 1969 gave the Boards
of County Commissioners discretionary power to release any lien if, in
its opinion, such a release would result in a larger net recovery for the
county, state and federal governments." It is clear that unevenness of
administration raises constitutional questions even under "traditional"
equal protection notions.
The Supreme Court has held that a state, in deciding whether laws
shall operate statewide or only in selected territories, has great latitude. 2
Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requirement, and the legis-
lature is free to determine priorities for its local subdivisions. 3 Such broad
discretion applies to welfare payments, and the state may allocate its
resources as it sees fit provided there is a rational basis. 4 A state, how-
ever, may not "purposefully" discriminate in applying an otherwise uniform
law. The constitutional principle was set out in Snowden v. Hughes:
35
property. He suggested that the guide for the welfare officials should not be
the "mere availability of some property but a genuine ability to repay without
sacrificing the basic incidents of self-support." Id. at 873.
_ N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 109-29, -35 (Supp. 1969).
"- See text preceding note 25 supra.
"Yancey County has not enforced the lien law since 1958 according to one
social services official. "Local politics" was the only explanation given.
= N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-37.1 (Supp. 1969).
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
Id. at 552.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to
be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimina-
tion. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to
a particular class of persons .. or it may only be shown by extrinsic
evidence showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or
class over another not to be inferred from the action itself.3 6
Since Szowden the Court has stated that "discrimination-in-fact" is
bad even when it "reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action."137 This would apparently condemn inefficient or haphazard admin-
istrative action, even if not intentionally discriminatory.8 There has been
some suggestion that even purposeful and apparently rational variations
within a state may be subject to closer scrutiny if the interests involved
are "fundamental":
Even though . . . territorial variations may not always constitute a
denial of equal protection there may be less justification for such a
permissive attitude where interests such as education are involved.
To be constitutional variations of this kind have to be shown to be
essential to some overriding state interest.8 9
An equally important question connected with the "new" equal pro-
tection doctrine, and one which involves the North Carolina statute, is the
determination of when the judiciary will look behind the "purpose" of the
legislation to analyze the "motives" of the legislature. Early constitutional
doctrine shunned looking to the "motives" of Congress, as this was deemed
a violation of the separation of powers principle.40 In later years, however,
the Supreme Court has at least given a hard look at the underlying pur-
pose if not the motives behind some legislation, namely that serving to
maintain school segregation4
1 or foster racial discrimination in voting.
2
" Id. at 8, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962).
"' J. Skelly Wright, writing for the District Court for the District of Columbia,
has denied that deliberate discrimination is essential for a violation of equal pro-
tection. "[G]overnment action which without justification imposes unequal burdens
or awards unequal benefits is unconstitutional." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
8 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAv. L. REv. 1065, 1096
(1969).
,Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
'x See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena
(Vol. 49
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The ostensible purpose of the North Carolina lien law is to reimburse
county and state treasuries for aid to the aged and disabled, thus allowing
more qualified poor persons to receive assistance. However, a brief review
of some of the statistics supplied by the Department of Social Services casts
doubt on this assumption.43 For the period beginning July 1, 1970, and
ending December 31, 1970, the net collection for all North Carolina coun-
ties reporting lien collections was 234,354 dollars. Fifty-two out of one
hundred counties collected old age assistance liens, and thirty-eight col-
lected disability liens during this period. From the total, the amount
returned to the federal government was 186,167 dollars, or nearly eighty
per cent. The state and counties then split the remainder equally-24,093
dollars going to the state treasury and an average of 395 dollars left
for each of sixty-one counties, the total number of counties reporting lien
collections.44
Contrasting the total contributions to the two programs by the state
and the counties with the lien reimbursements during the six month
period, the latter appears miniscule. According to the Department of
Social Services, the total amount expended by the state and counties for
the period was 6,655,022 dollars for the two assistance programs.4 5 Thus,
the total liens collected comprised only 3.5 per cent of the amounts ex-
pended by the state and counties for public assistance; but since eighty per
cent of that amount collected was returned to the federal treasury, only
0.72 per cent expended by the state and counties was actually recouped
by them through the liens.
The conclusion to be drawn from an overview of the statistics is that
reimbursement is not the only or perhaps not even the major reason for
the continuation of the liens. The federal government and the taxpayers
in all fifty states are the benefactors of lien collections in North Carolina.
Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.), aff'd per curinm, 368 U.S. 515
(1962).
" Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiacm, 336 U.S.
933 (1949). See generally Developments in the Law-Equat Protection, supra
note 39, at 1091-1101.
" The statistics appearing herein were made available upon request from the
Finance and Budget Section of the Department of Social Services, Raleigh, North
Carolina.
"Nine of the thirty-eight counties reporting collections of disability liens did
not collect old age liens. Attorneys' fees for the collection of the liens totaled
37,698 dollars over the six-month period, well over 100 percent of the total amount
returned to the counties that enforced the claims.
" 3,342,802 dollars were expended on old-age assistance and 3,312,219 dollars
on aid to the disabled. The state and counties each contributed fifty percent of the
total.
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The only fair deduction is that the liens are intended to deter the aged
and permanently and totally disabled from seeking public assistance. In
view of the fact that welfare assistance is now regarded as a "statutory
entitlement"46 instead of a charitable privilege it is questionable whether
such deterrence is constitutionally permissible. Even by rational standards,
classifying the aged and the disabled into such a category would hardly
stand analysis if deterrence is in fact a purpose behind the laws. It is
significant in this regard that those receiving "general assistance" in
North Carolina are persons ineligible for one of the federally-supported
categorical public assistance programs, and all of the funds for general
assistance must be raised at the county level at the discretion of the county
commissioners.4 ' Though the need for reimbursement would seem critical
at the local level no lien laws are applicable. Clearly, if North Carolina's
primary purpose in enforcing the lien is to provide reimbursement, the
present law is wholly unsatisfactory.
A narrow reading of recent judicial decisions would indicate that
welfare repayment laws, at least in the short run, will remain immune
from attack by the courts. A broader view of recent equal protection doc-
trine, however, both in the welfare field and in other areas where dis-
advantaged persons and fundamental rights are concerned, suggests that
such immunity may not endure.4 North Carolina's statute is vulnerable to
an attack under the new equal protection doctrine because of the im-
precision in its composition, the lack of uniformity in its enforcement and
the failure of the state to achieve its purported purpose. An analysis of
the statute and its administration lead to the conclusion not only that its
provisions raise constitutional questions but that its preservation is due
to political expediency rather than fiscal responsibility.
GARBER A. DAVIDSON, JR.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
' 7 M. Thomas, Jr., A Guide To Social Services in North Carolina 34 (1970).
The author cites authority for the fact that North Carolina was forty-first in the
nation in 1968 in per capita annual income and that there are many needy people
who are ineligible because they do not meet all of the qualifications established.
He gives as an example a father earning sixty dollars per week who is living in
the home with his wife and six children. His children are ineligible for AFDC
because they have not been deprived of parental support. Id. at 32.
"'But see Wyman v. James, 39 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1971), in which
the court rejected a fourth amendment challenge to a New York regulation which
requires home visits as a condition for receiving assistance. This decision may
portend a movement away from the "new" equal protection approach in welfare
cases.' But cf. Note, Poverty Law-Is a Search Warrant Required for Home
Visitation by Welfare Officials? 48 N.C.L. REv. 1010 (1970) (author reached a
contrary conclusion in writing on the court of appeals decision).
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